Abstract: We examine persistence in the performance of venture capital (VC) firms at the level of individual investments underlying fund returns. We find that, while initial success strongly predicts long-term success, the distribution of investments in state-industry-year cells accounts for roughly half of this performance persistence. We document a number of additional facts: (i) initial success appeared to stem from investing in the right industries and regions at the right times; (ii) but firms did not exhibit persistence in choosing the right industries and regions; (iii) venture capitalists did not improve in their performance with investing experience; (iv) firms that experienced early success shifted to investing in later rounds and in larger syndicates, and they became more central in the co-investment network; (v) these changes accounted for the majority of the remaining persistence in performance. Our results suggest that venture capital firms exhibit performance persistence because early success affords them greater access to deal flow in subsequent investments, thereby perpetuating differences in the outcome of initial investments.
Introduction
One of the more distinctive features of private equity as an asset class is the long-term persistence in the relative performance of private equity investors. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) , for example, found correlations of nearly 0.5 between the returns of one fund and the next one for a particular private equity firm. Among venture capital (VC) funds, they found even higher levels of persistence, with correlations approaching 0.7 (see also, Phalippou and Gottschalg 2009; Robinson and Sensoy 2013; Korteweg and Sørensen 2016) . By contrast, persistence has been almost non-existent among asset managers operating in the public equity markets, such as mutual funds and hedge funds (for reviews, see Ferson 2010; Wermers 2011). The most common interpretation of this persistence has been that private equity managers differ in their quality. Some managers, for example, may have greater ability to distinguish better investments from worse ones. They may also differ substantially in the degree to which they add value post-investment-for instance, by providing strategic advice to their portfolio companies or by helping them to recruit high-quality executives.
But these studies of persistence in private equity performance have generally been done at the fund level.
1 Although that focus has been entirely appropriate in terms of estimating the magnitudes of the serial correlations in returns and in understanding variance in investable performance, this level of aggregation has some disadvantages for disentagling the sources of persistence. It might, for example, occur simply because these managers focus their investments in particular regions and industries (Sorenson and Stuart 2001) . If those segments differ in terms of their positions in long-run cycles or in their levels of competition among private equity firms (e.g., Gompers and Lerner 2000), then one might observe persistence due simply to the fact that managers have consistent investing styles over time.
To gain greater insight into the sources of persistence, we therefore shift the unit of analysis to the indivdidual investment. Doing so allows us to control for differences in the average performance of investments at particular points in time, in particular regions, and in particular industries. It also allows us to examine persistence in performance within funds. We focus our analysis on the venture capital segment of private equity for two reasons. First, that segment has exhibited the highest levels of persistence (Kaplan and Schoar 2005) . Second, our shift in unit of analysis requires an investment-level performance measure. Although information on investment-level -as opposed to fund-level -returns has generally not been available for private equity, one can determine whether individual companies went public or were acquired. Since these forms of investment exits produce nearly all of the positive returns in venture capital (Cumming and MacIntosh 2003; Cochrane 2005) , the rates of these events within a particular fund correlate highly with fund returns (Phalippou and Gottschalg 2009).
Consistent with prior studies of returns at the fund-level, we find high levels of persistence in performance. A 20% higher IPO rate among the first five investments -that is, one additional IPO -for example, corresponds to a more than two percentage point higher IPO rate for the VC firm across all subsequent investments. Given that less than one in six investments in the sample resulted in an IPO, that implies a 12.7% higher likelihood of a public offering over the baseline.
We find that roughly half of this gross persistence stems from investing styles. Stateindustry-year-investment stage intercepts at the investment level absorb 46% to 56% of this gross persistence. But even within these tightly controlled cells, initial success still predicts long-term performance: a 20% higher IPO rate among the first five investments corresponds to a roughly 7% higher subsequent IPO rate, even within a particular region and industry and investment stage in a particular year. These differences attenuate over time, but, on average, success in the first five or ten investments predicts better performance for at least the next 50 investments made by a VC firm.
A natural explanation for this persistence in outcomes is that venture capitalists differ in their (unobserved) ability-for example in their aptitude for selecting the best startups and in their ability to mentor them to successful outcomes. But we find little evidence that such systematic skill differences across venture capitalists accounts for this persistence. For example, the average IPO and exit rates for all investments made by other VC firms in the same state-industry-year cells as the focal VC firm's first five or ten investments strongly predicted the observed success rates for the focal VC firm's initial investments. In other words, initial success stemmed largely from investing in the right place at the right time, rather than from picking or nurturing specific investments. In fact, regressions using the the average rates of success among other VC firms as an instrument for a focal VC firm's initial success (thereby purging the focal VC firm's unobserved ability from the estimates), generated at least as large estimates of persistence as the naïve linear regressions.
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Perhaps, then, differences in success in venture capital stem not so much from selecting and nurturing individual companies but from spotting trends, in terms of industries and regions about to emerge as hotspots? Here again, however, we find no evidence for inherent differences in the ability to choose the right sectors. VC firms that selected state-industryyear-investment stages with high average success rates for their first five or ten investments exhibited no persistence in their ability to choose similarly attractive industries and regions for their subsequent investments. We also find that investment success for VC firms did not improve with experience. In models with VC firm fixed effects included, success appeared to decline with the cumulative number of investments. Mixed coefficient models, however, revealed that this pattern emerged from a strong negative correlation -on the order of −0.9 -between initial success and the slope of the relationship between experience and success.
In other words, VC firms that had less success did better over time while those that did well initially declined in their performance. With experience, VC firms tended to converge to the average exit rates for the industry as a whole, suggesting a mean-reverting process.
The picture that emerges from these results is that initial success among VC firms seems 2 We would note that we do not claim that venture capitalists do not add value. Rather, any differences across venture capitalists in the the value they add plays no measurable role in increasing the odds of a successful outcome for a startup.
to stem from idiosyncratic shocks to investing cohorts rather than from the systematic ability of some venture capitalists to select better investments, to nurture them more effectively, or to choose the right times and places to invest on a consistent basis. Yet, this initial success appears consequential as it leads to persistence in outcomes, much like the divergent career paths of students who graduate in recessions versus in boom times (e.g., Oyer 2008; Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos, van Wachter and Heisz 2012) .
To understand how idiosyncratic shocks to performance can lead to longer-term persistence, we explore whether initial success might give VC firms better access to deal flow in their subsequent investments. To the extent that entrepreneurs believe that VC firms differ in their ability to nurture firms, entrepreneurs would prefer money from firms perceived as more able if they have multiple offers. But entrepreneurs have little on which to base their assessments of VC firm quality; even ex post they cannot determine whether another VC firm might have generated more value for them. Entrepreneurs may then rely on early successand the associated prestige of the firms enjoying it -as a signal of quality. Consistent with this idea, Hsu (2004) found that entrepreneurs preferred investments from higher status VC firms, even if they offered less attractive terms, and high status VC firms have been found to have access to a wider range of investments (Sorenson and Stuart 2001) and to enjoy higher average returns (Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu 2007) .
We find a number of results consistent with this access channel. First, we find that VC firms that enjoyed higher levels of initial success shifted their investments away from the initial round. A 20% increase in the number of IPOs in the first five investments corresponded to a roughly 2% reduction in the proportion of future investments made in the first round.
Second, these same VC firms also invested in more and larger syndicated rounds. The same 20% increase in the number of IPOs among the initial investments predicted a 4% larger average syndicate size across all future investments. Finally, initial success also led to more central positions within the industry. A 20% increase in the number of IPOs in the first five investments corresponded to a roughly 19% higher centrality score. Adjusting for these differences allows us to account for between half and three-quarters of the residual performance persistence within a particular region and industry and investment stage in a particular year. The "access" channel therefore appears to account for most of the persistence not due to investing styles.
Our results connect to several strands of the finance literature. Most directly, they advance the literature examining persistence in the performance of venture capital firms. Our investment-level analyses suggest that initial success matters for the long-run success of VC firms. Although most of these early differences in performance appear to emerge by chance, they become self-reinforcing as entrepreneurs and others interpret them as evidence of differences in quality, giving them preferential access and terms in investments. All venture capitalists may well add value to startups through the provision of capital and through mentoring and monitoring (e.g., Kortum and Lerner 2000; Hellmann and Puri 2002; Bernstein, Giroud and Townsend 2015) , but the persistent differences in performance across VC firms appear to stem more from firms that have become known for their past success having better access to future sought-after deals than from the better ability of these firms to select and nurture startups to success. This fact may also help to explain why persistence exists in private equity but not among mutual funds or hedge funds, as firms investing in public debt and equities do not need to compete for access to deals.
Interestingly, even if persistence emerges from access advantages rather than from innate differences in ability, investors in the asset class -the limited partners -would still prefer to invest in the most successful firms, especially in terms of performance net of the industries, regions, and stages in which they invested. Persistence due to where venture capitalists invested might simply reflect differences in the underlying risk factors in the VC firms' portfolios, the betas. But preferential access to deal flow probably not only raises the expected returns of their funds but also reduces the uncertainty associated with them. Not surprisingly then, VC firms that have enjoyed success in their earlier funds raise larger funds and raise them more frequently (Gompers et al. 1998; Kaplan and Schoar 2005) .
More broadly, our results also contribute to a recent literature in economics and finance that finds that initial differences, even if largely due to chance events, can have long lasting effects on outcomes. Oyer (2008) , Kahn (2010), Oreopoulos, van Wachter and Heisz (2012) and others, for example, have documented that graduating during a recession can lead individuals to pursue different career paths, with those entering the labor market during these downturns never reaching the income trajectories of their peers who entered during better economic times. Schoar and Zuo (2011) have similarly demonstrated that those beginning their careers during downturns who eventually become CEOs tend to lead smaller firms and to manage them more conservatively, in terms of investing less in capital expenditures and research and development and in terms of more aggressively managing costs and avoiding taxes. Our results point to a similar sort of long-term effect due to random initial differences. In part, these initial differences in success lead VC firms to pursue different investing paths, moving away from the first round and more into larger, syndicated investments. But in part, they appear to stem from initial differences in success creating beliefs about ability that persist as investors, entrepreneurs, and others act on those beliefs.
Data
We analyze data drawn from the VentureXpert database maintained by Thomson Reuters, which includes round-level information on venture capital investments across the world. VentureXpert has unique investor-and portfolio company-identifiers that allow us to trace the outcomes of individual portfolio companies and to construct the entire investment histories of nearly all VC firms. Although no data source offers complete coverage of all venture investments (Kaplan and Lerner 2015), Maats et al. (2011) and Kaplan and Lerner (2015) find that VentureXpert has better coverage than the primary alternatives at the level of individual investment rounds.
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We imposed several restrictions on the data to arrive at our final sample for analysis.
We began by limiting the analysis to investments made between 1961 and 2006 . Kaplan and Lerner (2015 reported that the firm that initiated the VentureXpert survey and database, which Thomson Reuters later acquired, began collecting information in 1961. Given that information prior to that year would have been collected retrospectively and therefore might be subject to some form of survival bias, we excluded VC firms that began investing prior to 1961 from the analysis. We also limited the analysis to firms involved in venture capital investing. VentureXpert includes the entire spectrum of private equity firms, from early stage venture investors to those engaged primarily in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). As noted above, our focus on performance at the investment level required an investment-level performance measure. For those engaged in venture capital investing, exits -whether through IPOs or through trade sales -provide a good measure of investment-level performance. But for firms engaged in other forms of investment, such as distressed debt and LBOs, these outcomes seem less relevant.
We therefore limited the sample (i) to VC firms classified as private partnerships, (ii) to funds classified as venture capital, and (iii) to investments in the four investment stages related to venture capital, namely "seed", "early", "expansion", and "later".
Because many follow-on investments -additional investments made by a VC firm in one of its existing portfolio companies -occur almost de facto if the target company has another investment round, we focused our analysis on the initial investments by particular VC firms in specific startup companies. 5 In other words, a portfolio company can appear in our sample multiple times, once for each VC firm that invested in it. Any given VC firm will also appear many times in our sample, once for each porfolio company in which it has invested. But, if a VC firm invests in the same portfolio company across multiple rounds, only the first investment by that VC -which might not represent the first round of investment in the portfolio company -appears in our sample. This restriction also prevents us from counting the same successful outcome more than once for any particular investor. target companies that have a successful exit in a fund has a very high correlation to the 5 VC firms often invest in all subsequent rounds pro rata to their initial investment, in part to protect the value of their equity position and in part because they become emotionally attached to their investments (Guler 2007) .
6 Although one might worry that VC firms would attempt to embellish their apparent success by disguising unsuccessful investments as acquisitions, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) found no evidence that VC firms pursued such a strategy.
7 Although other exit events, such as a buy back by management, could also result in positive returns, they represent relatively infrequent outcomes. ratio of distributed funds to funds paid in by the limited partners, a common measure of returns.
Performance Persistence in Venture Capital
We begin by documenting persistence in the performance of venture capital investors at the investment level. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between initial success -in a VC firm's first five investments -with the success of subsequent investments. As one can see, success in the first five investments strongly predicts subsequent success, whether one uses only investments that culminated in IPOs or those that led to either IPOs or trade sales as the measure of success (hereafter we refer to this combination of IPOs and trade sales simply as "exits"). For example, a VC firm that experienced three IPOs in its first five investments had about twice the IPO rate in its subsequent investments as a VC firm that had only had one IPO among its first five portfolio companies.
The associated partial correlations between performance in the first five or ten investments and that of subsequent investments range from roughly 0.12 to 0.19 (see Table 2 ).
Although this persistence appears far lower than that found in prior studies based on returns - Kaplan and Schoar (2005) , for example, reported correlations of 0.69 (PME) and 0.57 (IRR) between one VC fund and the next and Diller and Kaserer (2009) found similar levels of persistence for funds investing in Europe -these correlations differ in at least three important respects from those calculated in prior research. First, our correlations include all subsequent investments, not just those made in the subsequent fund. When we focus on the more proximate future investments (see Table 3 ), the serial correlation in success rises, though never to the levels observed by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) . Second, our focus on initial investments means that any differentials associated with some VC firms "doubling down" more effectively than others would not appear in our estimates.
8 Third, our sample includes nearly twice as many VC firms as these earlier studies, in part because our sample covers a longer period, in part because the database has fewer missing values for target company exits than for returns.
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Although this simple serial correlation suggests persistence in performance, it might emerge from a variety of factors, some of which could have little to do with the ability or quality of the VC firms. For example, returns and average IPO and exit rates might vary over time, across industries and regions, and by investment stage. Sorenson and Stuart (2001, 2008) found that VC firms had a strong tendency to invest in companies located close to their offices, to focus on a narrow range of industries, and to invest in particular stages of target company maturity, even after accounting for the supply of high-quality investments available in any particular quarter. If returns and success rates do differ across industries, regions, or investment stages, then persistence might emerge as an artifact of these consistent investing styles rather than because some VC firms enjoy better performance for a particular type of investment. Examining success at the level of the indivdiual investment allows us to account for these potential differences due to investing styles.
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To account for these differences, we therefore estimated a series of linear probability models with fixed effects:
where Y vi refers to the dichotomous outcome -either an IPO or any exit -of the investment made by VC firm v in the ith startup company in which it invested. Our main variable status VC firms renewed their investments in companies at lower rates than others. This factor may therefore account for some of the higher persistence in studies of fund returns relative to our results here. 9 The Venture Economics data used both here and by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) have a much higher proportion of missing data for fund returns than for the success of portfolio companies. If only the more successful funds reported their returns, that also could have led to an upward bias in the serial correlations reported by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) relative to the population of funds as a whole. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) nevertheless provided extensive evidence that any selection on who reported returns appeared relatively uncorrelated with performance and therefore should not have meaningfully influenced their estimates of persistence.
10 Kaplan and Schoar (2005) do adjust for industry and stage differences but their focus on the fund as the unit of analysis requires them to allocate all investments within a fund to a single industry and stage.
of interest isȲ v5(10) , the share of VC v's first five (or ten) investments that resulted in the outcome Y . The η ysjg represents the fixed effects included in the regression. The oddnumbered models in Table 2 include only fixed effects for the year of the investment. But the more restrictive even-numbered models have year-state-industry-stage fixed effects. In other words, among investments made in the same year in the same state in the same industry and at the same stage, do VC firms vary in their performance depending on the rates of success that they enjoyed in their first five or ten investments? We report standard errors clustered at the level of the VC firm and at the level of the the startup company, as we have repeated observations of the same startup company if more than one VC firm invested in it. A large share of this persistence, however, appears to stem from differences in the kinds of investments made by firms. Models 2 and 4 introduce the year-state-industry-stage fixed effects. In each of the models, these fixed effects absorb roughly half (46% to 56%) of the persistence observed in the models accounting only for vintage.
Even after adjusting for these fine-grained differences in kinds of investments, however, the proportion of IPOs (or exits) in the first five (or ten) investments by a VC firm still correlates strongly with the success of that firm's subsequent investments. Model 2 of Panel A, for example, implies that every additional IPO among the first five investments predicts 11 We estimated these models using the REGHDFE package in Stata (Correia 2014). a 1.3 percentage point higher IPO rate among all subsequent investments. Table 3 then investigates the duration of this persistence. Models 1 and 4 look at the 11th to the 30th investments made by a VC firm, Models 2 and 5, the 31st to the 60th investments, and Models 3 and 6, the 61st to the 100th investments. Models 1, 2, and 3 include only year fixed effects while Models 4, 5, and 6 incorporate year-state-industry-stage fixed effects. Panel A reports the results for IPOs only and Panel B for all exits. Whether IPOs or all exits and whether including only year fixed effects or the more fine-grained bins, the estimates consistently reveal a decline over time in the ability of success in the first ten investments to predict success in subsequent investments. But, even in the models with year-state-industry-stage fixed effects, VC firms that enjoyed higher initial success continued to experience higher subsequent success until at least their 60th investment.
12 If an average fund has roughly ten portfolio companies, these results would imply that the advantages of early success persist well into the sixth fund or later.
Sources of Persistence
Given that the persistence appears to be more than just a matter of investing styles, we next explored three potential mechanisms that might account for this persistence.
(1) VC firms may differ even at the point of entry in their ability to select promising startups or to mentor founding teams to success. (2) VC firms might learn-by-doing. In that case, early success might reflect faster learning or might afford VC firms a longer honeymoon period with investors, during which they can accrue valuable experience. (3) Early success might translate into prestige or status among other venture capitalists and among entrepreneurs that gives them preferential access to deal flow.
12 Because the sample size shrinks as we consider later investments, the standard errors also become larger. These estimates therefore represent a conservative test of the duration of persistence.
Innate differences
Target selection and nurturing: Venture capitalists spend a great deal of time screening and doing due diligence on potential investments, trying to understand which ones have the greatest potential for growth and profit. These efforts appear effective: Research, for example, has found that VC-backed firms patent at higher rates, operate more efficiently, grow faster, survive longer, and more commonly experience profitable exits than seemingly similar firms that did not receive venture capital financing ( A substantial body of research has also found that VC firms add value post-investment to their portfolio companies in a variety of ways. Hellmann and Puri (2002) , for example, found that companies that received investments from VC firms adopted more professional management practices closer to the time of founding. Bottazzi, Rin and Hellmann (2008) reported that more active VC firms appeared to increase the odds of a successful exit more than less active ones. And Bernstein, Giroud and Townsend (2015) further found that, when VC firms monitored and advised their portfolio companies more closely, those companies, in turn, went public at higher rates. Given the importance of selection and the numerous ways in which VC firms can add value post-investment, it would not seem surprising if some VC firms proved better at these activities than others.
One of the difficulties inherent in trying to determine whether innate differences might drive the variation in early success stems from the fact that one cannot readily assess quality independently from the investments and their observed success. We therefore took an indirect approach, estimating the extent to which one could predict early success on the basis of the average success of other venture investors in the same sorts of investments, and whether that average success for a particular type of investment, in turn, predicted persistence in investment success.
Why does that approach give us insight into innate differences? If some venture capital firms simply have a better ability to choose more promising companies or to nurture them to successful outcomes, then they should succeed at higher rates than their peers investing in similar sorts of deals. Moreover, if we use the success of peers as an instrumental variable to predict initial success -in essence, removing the endogenous portion of initial success that might stem from unobserved differences across VC firms -then the instrumented initial success variable should exhibit no (or much lower) persistence.
We therefore created a variable that captures the success of others who invested in the same times and places as the focal VC firm's initial investments. Specifically, for each of the initial investments, we calculated the average IPO and exit rates across all startups -except for the focal initial investments themselves -in the same year-state-industry-stage sectors as these initial investments. We then estimated:
whereȲ v5(10) denotes the share of VC firm v's first five (or first ten) investments that resulted in the outcome under question, either an IPO or any exit, andȲ ysjg −v5(10) refers to the mean outcome of all other startup companies that received venture capital investments in the same year-state-industry-stage cells as the focal VC firm's first five (or first ten) investments. The coefficient β 1 therefore captures success driven not so much by the focal firm's choices and activities but by factors common to the context in which the VC firm has been investing. Table 4 reports the results of these models. Panel A estimates the effects on IPO rates while Panel B estimates them on all exits. Models 1 and 2 consider only the first five investments of the focal VC firm while Models 3 and 4 consider the first ten investments. Given that this variable has one value per VC firm, Models 1 and 3 include only one observation per VC firm. However, as noted above, these models also serve as the first stage of an instrumental variable (IV) regression. Since the second stage requires one observation for each subsequent investment made by the VC firm, Models 2 and 4 report these estimates at the investment level. Thus, for example, a firm that made investments in 50 target companies would appear either 45 times (i.e. the 6th to 50th investments) or 40 times (i.e. the 11th to the 50th investments).
All of the models reveal a strong positive correlation between the success of the focal investor and that of other VC firms who invested in the same fine-grained year-state-industrystage cells. In large part, then, early success depended simply on having been in the right place at the right time-that is, investing in industries and in regions that did particularly well in a given year. Models 2, 4, 6, and 8, meanwhile, report the results instrumenting for initial success.
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Interestingly, not only do the instrumented results for success also exhibit persistence but the estimated magnitude of the persistence increases by roughly 50% to 100% in the IV regressions, though the larger standard errors mean that one cannot reject the null that the IV regression produces equivalent estimates of effect sizes. Recall, however, that the expectation -if innate differences in either target selection or mentoring ability drove the results -had been to see no, or at least much less, persistence in the instrumented models.
The fact that persistence appears no lower using the IV suggests that the value of initial success stems from the initial success itself, rather than from some unobserved factor related to both that initial success and future success.
Sector selection: Although the IV regression analysis largely eliminates the possibility that some VC firms have a better ability to select future winners or a greater ability to nurture them to success, VC firms may still differ in their ability to select good investments at a more macro level. Perhaps some venture capitalists have an ability to choose the industries 13 The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F -statistic (Kleibergen and Paap 2006) assesses the strength of the first stage. It has the benefit of being robust to non-i.i.d. errors and thus suitable for clustered standard errors (as used here). Across all of the regressions, with the exception of the first five investments using all exitsthis F -statistic has a value close to or significantly higher than the established boundary of roughly 16 for the instrument to have sufficient strength to eliminate more than 90% of the bias in the naïve regressions (Stock and Yogo 2005) .
and regions about to emerge as hotspots. If so, then being in the right place at the right time may depend not just on chance but also on the ability to see these emerging trends.
We explore this issue by examining whether VC firms exhibit persistence in choosing attractive sectors. We measure the attractiveness of a year-state-industry-stage cell as above (in defining the instrumental variable); that is, for each investment, we calculate the attractiveness of the sector as the average IPO rate (or exit rate) experienced by all startup companies in the same year-state-industry-stage receiving an investment from another VC firm. We regressed this measure of sector attractiveness on the average quality of the first five or ten segments in which the VC firm invested. We also add a fixed effect for the year of the investment. Although VC firms can choose where to invest, they have less freedom to time their investments because of the limited life spans of their funds. Thus, we estimate: 
Learning
Another potential explanation for the persistence of initial success could involve learningby-doing. Initial success, even if not indicative of innate differences, could reflect learning or could give venture capitalists leeway with their investors to get better at the trade. Although to a certain extent each potential investment represents a unique opportunity, VC firms may learn to understand the industry or business model better over time. Kempf, Manconi and Spalt (2014) , for example, found that learning-by-doing even appears to occur among mutual fund managers. Managers with more experience investing in a particular industry earned higher abnormal returns in it, in large part because they appeared better at anticipating earnings surprises. Within the venture capital industry, Sørensen (2007) uses the number of investments that a VC firm has made as a proxy for its quality and finds positive associations between this experience and the rates at which portfolio companies have successful exits. We therefore examined whether VC firms appeared to improve in their outcomes with experience. Table 7 does not occur at the firm level. We therefore introduced VC firm-level fixed effects in Models 2 and 5. Surprisingly, after the introduction of these fixed effects, the coefficient on experience flips sign: success rates appear to decline with experience.
To investigate this puzzling result more closely, Models 3 and 6 then estimate mixed models, where we allowed each individual VC firm to have a different learning rate as well as a different base level of success. In other words, we allowed these variables to have random coefficients. In these mixed models, experience, on average, has an estimated coefficient very close to zero. But it varies substantially (see the standard deviation of the estimated experience coefficient), meaning that many VC firms appeared to get better over time and many others appeared to get worse. Interestingly, however, the correlation between these estimated firm-specific learning coefficients and those of the firm-specific intercepts is roughly −0.9 (ranging from −0.88 to −0.95 across the various models), meaning that those firms with the highest average performance declined over time while those with the lowest average performance improved.
This decline in performance for those who had high initial success and improvement in performance for those who had lower initial success, of course, suggests a mean-reverting process. Figure 2 reveals that a pattern consistent with mean reversion appears even in the unadjusted data. Each dot on this plot represents the entire history of one VC firm in our sample. The X-axis corresponds to the total number of startups the VC firm invested in during our sample period and the Y-axis indicates the proportion of those startup companies that either had an IPO (upper panel) or any exit (lower panel). Apart from one or two outliers, the graph illustrates a pattern of strong convergence to the mean: the VC firms with the largest total number of investments converge to the industy average success rate.
Two additional points about this graph seem worth noting here. First, the somewhat greater mass below the mean than above it suggests that those with below-mean average performance suffer lower survival chances. Second, performance differences would appear to decline rather than to increase over time (consistent with Table 3 ). If they increased, then one would expect to see divergence rather than convergence in performance. Focusing on the persistence of initial performance differences therefore does not appear to miss performance heterogeneity that emerges later.
Access to Deal Flow
A third factor involves preferential access to deal flow. Such access might emerge through a couple of distinct channels. But both channels depend on the idea that potential partners face uncertainty about the quality of those with whom they work and that they interpret early success -and any prestige or reputation that it engenders -as a signal of higher quality.
One involves the entrepreneurs themselves. Those startups that have the highest potential likely have multiple suitors. One would generally expect that this competition would drive up the price of the target company's equity, effectively competing away any potential excess returns that investors might earn (Gompers and Lerner 2000). But Hsu (2004) found that entrepreneurs accepted lower valuations from high status VC firms in these situations, presumably because they believed that these investors would better nurture their businesses or that they would offer them greater certification value. To the extent that early success translates into a reputation or status that entrepreneurs value, these better deal terms might then account for persistence in excess returns (Kaplan and Schoar 2005).
The second stems from the importance of social relationships in the venture capital community. Because VC firms frequently invest in groups and because access to those syndicates often requires the acquiescence of the existing investors, who you know matters to deal flow. Sorenson and Stuart (2001) found that as VC firms gained experience and came to occupy more central positions in the industry, firms could invest at greater distances and in a wider range of industries. In essence, having a more expansive network of investing partners appeared to allow VC firms to consider a wider range of deals. Consistent with the idea that choosing from a larger set of investment options would lead to higher returns, Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007), in turn, found a positive relationship between centrality and the success rates of the investments made by VC firms. Thus, to the extent that early success means that a VC firm becomes more attractive as a co-investor, persistence might emerge from this expanded access to deal flow.
To explore this channel, we investigated how the characteristics of later investments correlated with initial success, controlling for the characteristics of the initial investments. We have one observation per later investment (i.e., the 6th and subsequent, or the 11th and subsequent investments). The dependent variables are the characteristics of those investments or of the VC firm at the time of that investment -round of the investment, the syndication of the investment, the amount of the investment, and the centrality of the focal VC firm in the syndication network -and the primary explanatory variable of interest is the level of initial success enjoyed by the VC firm. In particular, we estimated:
where C vi refers to the characteristic of interest for VC firm v at the time of the investment in target company i,C v5 denotes the average value of the characteristic in question across the first five investments made by the VC firm v, and φ y represents fixed effects for the year of the investment. Table 8 first considers the investment round. As a startup company matures, more information becomes available about its chances of success. Hence, investors can more easily discriminate the wheat from the chaff, the companies with the highest potential from the also-rans. Models 1 and 2 consider only whether the investment occurred in the first round of investment in the target company. All of the models suggest that VC firms reduced the proportion of investments made in the first round with initial success. Each additional initial exit predicts a 0.7 to 1.1 percentage point drop in the probability of a first round investment. Models 3 and 4, then, consider whether initial success led to general movement towards the later rounds. Here, however, the effects are sufficiently small and imprecisely estimated that one cannot distinguish them from zero.
We next consider the probability of investing as part of a syndicate and the average size of those syndicates (Table 9 ). Models 1 and 2 examine simply whether the investment round involved more than one investor. Initial success appears to lead to more syndicated investments. Each additional initial exit corresponded to a 0.9 to 1.9 percentage point increase in the probability of syndication. Given the roughly 12% baseline probability of a solo investment, this effect amounts to a 7-14% decline in the probability of a solo investment for each initial exit. Models 3 and 4 then consider whether initial success also corresponded to investing in larger syndicates. It did, with each additional initial exit predicting a roughly 4% increase in the number of co-investors in subsequent investment rounds. Table 10 finally considers whether initial success led to larger average investments and to firms becoming more central in the co-investment network. Models 1 and 2 report estimates of the effects on the size of the average investment made by a member of a syndicate in which the focal VC participated. 14 Initial success led to larger future investments, with each additional initial exit corresponding to a 5.6% increase in the amount invested per participant in the syndicate. 15 Models 3 and 4 finally examine the changes in eigenvector centrality associated with initial success. 16 These models reveal the largest correlates of initial success, with a 20% higher success rate among the initial five or ten investments predicting a 12% to 22% increase in centrality.
We should note that all of these changes hold in models where we instrument initial success using the same instrument as reported in the first stages in Table 4 . These changes therefore appear to stem from initial success itself rather than from unobserved factors related to both early success and investing strategies.
But do these changes in position and investing behavior account for performance persistence? Table 11 implies that limited partners should not worry so much that partners that spin out into their own firms will not replicate their earlier success.
but this centrality measure appears to be one of the centrality measures most strongly associated with fund performance (Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu 2007) .
To understand better what channels might account for persistence in the performance of private equity firms, we examine how the performance of VC firms' investments -in terms of having successful exits, either through IPOs or trade sales -depend on their initial success. We find that long-term success depends strongly on initial success, that initial success depends primarily on investing in the right place at the right time, and that VC firms do not choose the right places and times at a rate higher than chance. We also find that VC firms did not appear to get better with experience, but that VC firms enjoying early success did shift their investments to later stages and to syndicated investments. Initial success also led these firms to occupy more central positions in the co-investment network.
The picture that emerges then is one where persistent performance differences across VC firms stem from the fact that early success gives the firms enjoying it preferential access to deal flow. Both entrepreneurs and other VC firms want to partner with them. VC firms therefore get to see more deals, particularly in later stages, when it becomes easier to predict which companies might have successful outcomes.
This channel would also help to explain why persistence appears in private equity but not in most other settings, such as mutual funds and hedge funds. For investors primarily purchasing and selling public securities, access depends only on price. When multiple firms perceive an opportunity they therefore compete away the returns associated with it. But, in private equity, access often depends on more than price. It operates as a two-sided market.
Because entrepreneurs and other investors believe that they might benefit from affiliating with higher status investors -who they believe may have greater ability to create value for them -they willingly accept lower prices from these individuals and firms, allowing them to earn rents on their reputations.
Because this mechanism depends to some extent on the idea that the supply of capital exceeds the demand for it, at least for deals with less uncertainty, it also implies that the returns to status should become most pronounced during periods when venture capital be-comes plentiful. Indeed, consistent with this expectation, Shi, Waguespack and Sorenson (2015) , exploring the temporal sensitivity of the results in Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) , found that VC firms central in the co-investment network only had higher success rates during booms. During busts, they actually appeared to underperform other VC firms.
Even though these differences do not emerge from heterogeneity in the abilities of VC firms, investors in venture capital, limited partners, can potentially still invest in them to earn excess returns. Whether they can do so, however, depends in large part on whether investors have enough information about the performance of previous funds at the time that they must decide whether to invest in future ones. Phalippou (2010) Notes: The data is from the VentureXpert database of Thomson-Reuters and the sample consists of venture capital (VC) firms based in the United States and their investments in startup companies based in the United States. Only VC firms classified as private partnerships and funds classified as venture capital are included. Only investments in stages classified as "seed", "early", "expansion", and "later" are included and only the first investment by a VC firm in a particular startup company. The data covers the period from 1961 to 2006 and includes only VC firms who made their first investment in 1961 or later. "Yr-St-Ind-Stg" is short for "yearstate-industry-stage", "Cos" is short for "startup companies", "prop" is short for "proportion", and "exits" include IPOs and acquisitions. Notes: The sample consists of the first investment made by a venture capital (VC) firm in a target company, starting with the sixth company (Models 1-2) or the eleventh company (Models 3-4) in which the VC firm invested. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the target company had an IPO (Panel A) or an exit (Panel B) , that is, an IPO or a trade sale. The independent variables measure the initial success of the VC firm by calculating the proportion of IPOs (or exits) in the first five (or ten) target companies in which the VC firm invested.
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by VC firm and startup company. Fixed effects in regressions: Y = Year; YSIS = Year-State-Industry-Stage. Statistical significance: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table 5 .
The independent variables measure the average IPO or exit rate of all startup companies that received a round of VC investment in the same year-state-industry-stage sector as the first five or ten companies in which focal VC firm invested. The calculation excludes all startup companies in which the focal VC firm ever invested.
OLS regression with standard errors clustered by VC firm. Statistical significance: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 (Models 1 and 3) or the 11th (Models 2 and 4) company in which the VC firm invested. The dependent variable in Models 1-2 is a dummy variable indicating whether the round was the first VC round in the startup company and in Models 3-4 the log of the sequence number of the investment round in the startup company.
The independent variables measure the proportion of IPOs or exits (including IPOs and acquisitions) in the first 5 (Models 1 and 3) or the first ten (Models 2 and 4) companies in which the VC firm invested as well as the proportion of first rounds in those investments or the log of the average round sequence number in those investments.
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by VC firm and startup company. Fixed effects in regressions: Y = Year. Statistical significance: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 (Models 1 and 3) or the 11th (Models 2 and 4) company in which the VC firm invested. The dependent variable in Models 1-2 is a dummy variable indicating whether the round was syndicated and in Models 3-4 the log of the number of syndicate partners in the round, including the focal VC firm as well as non-VC investors.
The independent variables measure the proportion of IPOs or exits (including IPOs and acquisitions) in the first 5 (Models 1 and 3) or the first 10 (Models 2 and 4) companies in which the VC firm invested as well as the proportion of syndicated rounds in those investments or the log of the average number of syndicate partners in those investments.
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by VC firm and startup company. Fixed effects in regressions: Y = Year. Statistical significance: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 (Models 1 and 3) or the 11th (Models 2 and 4) company in which the VC firm invested. The dependent variable in Models 1-2 is the log of average size of the investment the focal round (in 2015 dollars) by a syndicate member and in Models 3-4 the eigenvector centrality of the focal VC firm in the syndication network of all VC firms at the time of the investment.
The independent variables measure the proportion of IPOs or exits (including IPOs and acquisitions) in the first 5 (Models 1 and 3) or the first 10 (Models 2 and 4) companies in which the VC firm invested as well as the average size of the average investment (in 2015 dollars) in the first five or ten companies in which the VC firm invested and the eigenvector centrality at the time of the fifth or the tenth investment.
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by VC firm and startup company. Fixed effects in regressions: Y = Year. Statistical significance: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Notes: The sample consists of the first investment made by a venture capital (VC) firm in a startup company, starting with the sixth company the VC firm invested in (Models 1-2 and 5-6) or the eleventh company the VC firm invested in (Models 3-4 and 7-8). Panel A considers whether the startup company had an IPO and Panel B considers whether the startup company had any exit, IPO or acquisition. The main independent variables measure the initial success of the VC firm by calculating the proportion of IPOs or exits in the first five or ten startup companies in which the VC firm invested. The other independent variables measure the log of the round number of the focal investment, the log of the count of participants in the syndicate of the focal round, the log of average size of the investment the focal round (in 2015 dollars) by a syndicate member, and the eigenvector centrality of the focal VC firm in the syndication network of all VC firms at the time of the investment.
OLS regression with standard errors clustered by VC firm. Fixed effects in regressions: Y = Year; YSIS = Year-State-Industry-Stage. Statistical significance: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 
